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THE PRAGMATIC MIGRATORY BIRD 
TREAlY ACT: PROTECTING "PROPERlY" 
HYE-JONG LINDA LEE* 
Abstract: In 1916, the United States of America entered into a treaty with 
the United Kingdom, acting on behalf of Canada, to protect migratory 
birds from unrestrained killing. Two years later, Congress enacted the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) to give effect to this convention. The 
United States subsequently entered into similar agreements with Mexico 
in 1936, Japan in 1972, and the Soviet Union in 1976, which were 
thereafter incorporated into the provisions of the MBTA. The MBTA's 
prohibition against pursuing, hunting, taking, capturing, or killing any 
migratory bird, or any part, nest, or egg of such birds, however, is not 
motivated by the desire to protect human property interests. This Note 
explores America's attachment to wildlife as property under the terms of 
the conventions, the statutory language, the history, and the caselaw 
pertaining to the MBTA, with specific focus on the curious distinction 
between wild and captive-bred mallard ducks. 
Wild beasts and birds are by right not the property merely of the people today, 
but the property of the unborn generations, whose belongings we have no right 
to squander.1 
-Theodore Roosevelt 
INTRODUCTION 
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) was enacted in 1916 to 
protect migratory birds from unrestrained killing. The MBTA, how-
ever, treats migratory birds as human property that is deserving of 
protection only to the extent that they continue to serve human in-
terests. When the protection of migratory birds interferes with human 
property interests, the MBTA offers little protection. 
This Note explores the utilitarian ethics that underlie the MBTA. 
Part I examines the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, including how the 
* Note Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2003-04. I 
would like to thank my editorial staff for their infinite hours spent on enhancing this Note, 
and Frank Bond for his insights and encouragement. I would also like to thank my mother, 
KyungJa Kong, and Derek Domian for their affection, inspiration, and support. 
1 LISA MIGHETTO, WILD ANIMALS AND AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 27 (1991). 
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MBTA came to be, its structure, and its applicability to captive-raised 
birds. Part IT analyzes the intrinsic notion of property motivating the 
MBTA's protection of migratory birds by examining the statutory lan-
guage of the conventions that preceded the passage of the MBTA, the 
language of the MBTA itself, and courts' distinct treatment of captive-
bred migratory birds in contrast to wild migratory birds. Part IT also 
considers the inevitable concessions and dangers that thinking of mi-
gratory birds and wildlife as human property prompts in wildlife law, 
and concludes that as long as wildlife statutes keep human interests 
predominant, environmental protection of species will remain thin. 
I. THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT 
A The Development of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
The famous case of Pierson v. Post owes its celebrity to something 
more than its status as a staple of first year property courses.2 Its ce-
lebrity derives, in large part, from its uncritical announcement of 
early America's attitudes towards wildlife-attitudes rooted in the no-
tion that wildlife was something to be owned and possessed.3 Mter all, 
it is a case about wildlife written in the language of property.4 More 
specifically, it is written in the language of possession: 
actual bodily seizure is not indispensable to acquire right to, 
or possession of, wild beasts; but . . . mortal wounding of 
such beasts ... be deemed possession of him; since, thereby, 
the pursuer manifests an unequivocal intention of appropri-
ating the animal to his individual use, has deprived him of 
his natural liberty, and brought him within his certain con-
trol ... [and] may justly be deemed to give possession of 
them to those persons who, by their industry and labour, 
have used such means of apprehending them.5 
2 3 Cai. R. 175, 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). While Post was pursuing a fox on unowned 
property, Pierson, knowing that the fox was being hunted, killed and carried off the same 
fox. Id. The court found for Pierson, holding that mere chase of wildlife is insufficient, and 
mortal wounding is necessary to confer rights of possession over wildlife. Id. The case of 
Pierson v. Post is often a part of first-year property curricula in numerous law schools across 
the United States. 
SId. 
4Id. 
5Id. at 178. 
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In this way, the resolution of a hunting dispute over beasts of ferae na-
turae 6 becomes emblematic of the dominant conception of wildlife 
adopted early in America's history: wildlife as property, as an available 
resource to be owned, possessed, and used.7 Early Americans typically 
understood wildlife in terms limited to its utilitarian and human 
value: as a source of food and clothing, as a force of agricultural labor 
and service, as a method of pest control, and as the lively object of 
sport.s In other words, early American society "viewed wildlife as a 
'bottomless pit' from which it could take indiscriminately. "9 Markets 
and cottage industries encircled this bottomless pit.10 In the nine-
teenth century, market hunting became popular, and wildlife mer-
chandise became readily available to public markets for consumption 
and fashion. ll For instance, urban restaurant menus were eager to 
feature a wide range of fowl, and consumption was not limited to 
game birds: "many songbirds also were viewed as appropriate food for 
humans. Robins, for example, were served in soups, while cedar wax-
wings and goldfinches made 'hearty' pies. Also available for purchase 
were batches of bobolinks, bundled and tied together like carrots. "12 
The tastes and customs of fashionable women created much demand 
for the killing of non-game birds, and "[s]o extensive was the use of 
feathers as well as whole birds on women's hats that ... 'church gath-
erings and other social events often resembled aviaries.'"1:,! 
Hence, until the twentieth century, market hunters "killed migra-
tory birds on a vast scale for profit; some massacred birds for the 
sheer hell of it."14 Due to the unrestrained hunting and killing of 
game birds, several migratory bird species valued as a food source and 
6 The term "ferae naturae" means "of a wild nature" and refers to "wild animals." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 256 (pocket ed. 1996). 
7 See, e.g., MIGHETID, supra note 1. 
S SIMON LYSTER, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL' 
TREATIES CONCERNED WITII TIlE CONSERVATION OF WILDLIFE, at xxii (1985); Thomas A. 
Lund, Early American Wildlife Law, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 706 (1976). 
9 David G. Lombardi, Comment, The Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Steel Shot Versus Lead Shot 
for Hunting Migratory Waterfow~ 22 AKRON L. REV. 343, 343 (1989). 
10 See MIGHETID, supra note I, at 38. 
HId. 
12Id. 
1~ Id. (quoting JAMES B. TREFETIlEN, AN AMERICAN CRUSADE FOR WILDLIFE 129 (Win-
chester Press 1975)). 
14 Larry M. Corcoran & Elinor Col bourn, Shocked, Crushed and Poisoned: Criminal En-
forcement in Non-Hunting Cases Under the Migratory Bird Treaties, 77 DENV. U. L. REv. 359, 359 
(1999). 
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as insect control were in danger of extinction.15 Concerned sports-
men, farmers, and the general public advocated the need to protect 
migratory birds for both economic and aesthetic reasons. 16 In fact, 
much of wildlife protection was advocated by sportsmen, who an-
nounced the need for conservation through a variety of hunting 
journals like American Sportsman, Forest and Stream, Field and Stream, 
and American Angler.17 
In 1916, motivated by fears of extinction and population decline 
of several migratory bird species, the United States of America en-
tered into a treaty with the United Kingdom, which was acting on be-
half of Canada, "for the protection of migratory birds in the United 
States and Canada. "18 Two years later, Congress enacted the MBTA19 
to give effect to this convention, prohibiting the taking, killing, or 
possessing of migratory birds covered by the treaty, except as other-
wise permitted by regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary of 
the In terior. 20 
The MBTA served diverse purposes.21 First, Congress wished to 
regulate commercial and recreational hunting, especially targeting 
the villain of the act, the notorious "pothun ter. "22 As one Senator de-
clared, "[t]his law is aimed at the professional pothunter."23 The 
MBTA was to "keep pothunters from killing game out of season, ruin-
ing the eggs of nesting birds, and ruining the country by it. "24 While 
the Act singled out the hunter who refused to play by the rules of the 
game, it did purport to regulate recreational hunters as well.25 In a 
cynical stab at recreational hunters, one representative warned, "peo-
15 Conrad A. Fjetland, Possibilities for Expansion of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act for the Pro-
tection of Migratory Birds, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 47, 47 (2000). 
16 Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note 14, at 359. 
17 MIGHETTO, supra note I, at 27. In fact, the Audubon Society, an organization dedi-
cated to protecting birds and other wildlife, was founded by a sportsman. Id. at 38. The 
members of the Audubon Society advocated against killing non-game birds, destroying 
their nests and eggs, and wearing decorative feathers. Id. 
18 Convention Between United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migra-
tory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, U.S.-U.K., 39 Stat. 1702 [hereinafter Canadian Convention]. 
19 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2000). 
20 Id. § 703. 
21 See, e.g., United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1079-82 
(D. Colo. 1999). 
2255 CONGo REC. 4402 (1917). A "pothunter" is a hunter who kills and takes for food 
without regard for the rules of the sport. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 921 (1985). 
2~ 55 CONGo REC. 4402 (1917). 
24 Id. at 4816. 
25 56 CONGo REC. 7360 (1918). 
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pIe who are against this bill are ... some so-called city sportsmen, who 
want spring shooting just to gratifY a lust for slaughter."26 
The MBTA also contemplated agricultural benefits.27 Not only 
was there value in saving birds from the reckless slaughter of unre-
strained hunting, but there was also value in keeping birds alive to do 
what they did so well: eat crop-damaging insects.28 Congress took no-
tice of annual food losses caused by insects and proclaimed the need 
to protect the birds.29 Finally, Congress recognized the aesthetic value 
of migratory birds.30 The MBTA guaranteed that migratory birds 
would continue to be part of America's aesthetic recreation by "[pro-
viding] some place where [migratory birds] can come and remain 
safely and be a pleasure and companions. "31 In the words of one rep-
resentative, the MBTA ought to protect migratory birds because "ad-
miration for our little friends of the air ma[de him] unfriendly to the 
habit of killing off these winged visitors, whether game birds, migra-
tory birds, or other species .... "32 The MBTA gave the United States a 
variety of reasons for finding some value in protecting its disappear-
ing winged visitors. 
As such, the MBTA was the first significant legislative pronounce-
ment of environmental conservation as an important national policy 
goal for the United States,33 and it was declared the "most important 
early federal legislation concerning the preservation of wildlife. "34 In 
defending its constitutionality against a state's Tenth Amendment chal-
lenge in Missouri v. Holland, Justice Holmes declared the protection of 
migratory birds to be a "national interest" warranting "national ac-
tion. "35 He found no constitutional obstacle to such a laudable action: 
"[b]ut for the treaty and the statute there soon might be no birds for 
any powers to deal with. We see nothing in the Constitution that com-
26 [d. 
27 See, e.g., id. at 7360 (statement of Representative Stedman emphasizing that the pur-
pose of this bill is to give effect to the convention that insectivorous migratory birds, in 
addition to migratory game birds, are embraced in the terms of the treaty). 
28 [d. 
29 [d. 
!!O 56 CONGo REC. 7458 (1918). 
31 [d. 
32 [d. at 7357. 
33 Erin C. Perkins, Comment, Migratory Birds and Multiple-Use Management: Using the Mi-
gratory Bird Treaty Act to Rejuvenate America's National Environmental Policy, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 
817,822 (1998). 
34 Lombardi, supra note 9, at 343. 
:IS 252 U.S. 416, 434-35 (1920). 
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pels the Government to sit by while a food supply is cut off and the pro-
tectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed. "36 
The United States of America subsequently entered into similar 
agreements with Mexico in 1936,37 Japan in 1972,38 and the Soviet Un-
ion in 1976,39 for the protection of migratory birds, which were there-
after incorporated into the provisions of the MBTA.40 The four trea-
ties slightly differed, however, in their purposes, scope, and 
exceptions.41 
The Canadian Convention cited the importance of migratory 
birds as food and as predators of insects as the main reason for enter-
ing into the Convention.42 On the other hand, the Mexican Conven-
tion focused more broadly on preserving migratory birds "for pur-
poses of sport, food, commerce, and industry. "43 The Japanese and 
Russian Conventions were motivated by the sweeping purpose of en-
hancing the environment of migratory birds, finding them a natural 
resource of great recreational, aesthetic, scientific, cultural, ecologi-
cal, and economic value.44 
The scope of these treaties differed as well.45 The Canadian Con-
vention defined protected birds as migratory game birds, migratory 
insectivorous birds, and migratory non-game birds, listing five families 
of game birds and groups of non-game birds to be protected.46 The 
Mexican Convention listed protected families of migratory birds with-
out specifYing the species included in such families.47 The Japanese 
Convention broadened the list of protected birds to non-migratory 
36 [d. 
37 Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, Feb. 7, 1936, 
U .S.-Mex., 50 Stat. 1311 [hereinafter Mexican Convention]. 
38 Convention for Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction in 
their Environment, Mar. 4, 1972, U.S.:Japan [hereinafter Japanese Convention]. 
39 Convention Concerning the Conservation of Migratory Birds and Their Environ-
ment, Nov. 19, 1976, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 29 U.S.T. 4647 [hereinafter Russian Convention]. 
40 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2000). 
41 See generally Russian Convention, supra note 39; Japanese Convention, supra note 3S; 
Mexican Convention, supra note 37; Canadian Convention, supra note IS. 
42 Canadian Convention, supra note IS, at 1702. 
43 Mexican Convention, supra note 37, at 1312. 
44 Russian Convention, supra note 39, at 4649; Japanese Convention, supra note 3S, at 
3331. 
45 See, e.g., Russian Convention, supra note 39, at 4650-51; Japanese Convention, supra 
note 3S, at 3332-33; Mexican Convention, supra note 37, at 1313-14; Canadian Conven-
tion, supra note IS, at 1702-03. 
46 Canadian Convention, supra note IS, at 1702-03. 
47 Mexican Convention, supra note 37, at 1313-14. 
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birds common to both Japan and the United States,48 whereas the Rus-
sian Convention included species and subspecies that migrated be-
tween the two countries and those with separate populations sharing 
common breeding, wintering, feeding, or molting areas.49 The Russian 
Convention allowed either party to expand the list of migratory birds 
unilaterally, so long as a bird belonged to a family already protected.50 
Each Convention provided exceptions authorizing the taking of 
protected birds.51 In large part, the exceptions were simply intended 
to reinstate the dominant policy of serving the original purposes for 
protecting these birds in the first place.52 For instance, the Canadian 
Convention permitted killing migratory birds that "under extraordi-
nary conditions, may become seriously injurious to the agricultural or 
other interests in any particular community."53 The Mexican Conven-
tion did so too, albeit more restrictively, authorizing taking of birds 
only "when they become injurious to agriculture and constitute 
plagues. "54 Since birds also had scientific value, all the treaties pro-
vided exceptions for scientific and propagative purposes.55 The Mexi-
can and Japanese Conventions extended takings privileges to the tak-
ing of protected birds from private game farms, 56 and indigenous 
people were permitted to freely take migratory birds for food supply 
under the Japanese and Russian Conventions.57 
The MBTA presently incorporates all four Conventions, serving 
as a regulatory device for implementing and amending provisions 
deemed necessary to protect migratory birds and their environ-
ment.58 
B. The Structure of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
The MBTA states that, 
48 Japanese Convention, supra note 38, at 3332. 
49 Russian Convention, supra note 39, at 4650. 
50 Id. at 4656. 
51 See, e.g., Canadian Convention, supra note 18, at 1703. 
52 See, e.g., id. at 1704. 
53 Id. (emphasis added). 
54 Mexican Convention, supra note 37, at 1313 (emphasis added). 
55 Russian Convention, supra note 39, at 4651-53; Japanese Convention, supra note 38, 
at 3333-34; Mexican Convention, supra note 37, at 1312-13; Canadian Convention, supra 
note 18, at 1704. 
56 Japanese Convention, supra note 38, at 3333-34; Mexican Convention, supra note 
37, at 1312-13. 
57 Russian Convention, supra note 39, at 4651-53; Japanese Convention, supra note 38, 
at 3333-34. 
58 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2000). 
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it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any man-
ner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, cap-
ture, or kill ... any migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg of 
any such bird, or any product ... which consists, or is com-
posed in whole or part, of any such bird or any part, nest, or 
egg thereof ... [if the bird is included in the four Conven-
tions] .59 
The MBTA gives the Secretary of the Interior the authority to: 
carry out the purposes of the conventions ... having due re-
gard to the zones of temperature and to the distribution, 
abundance, economic value, breeding habits, and times and 
lines of migratory flight of such birds, to determine when, to 
what extent, if at all, and by what means, it is compatible 
with the terms of the conventions to allow hunting, taking, 
capture, killing, possession, sale, purchase, shipment, trans-
portation, carriage, or export of any such bird, or any part, 
nest, or egg thereof .... 60 
Persons found in violation of the MBTA can be arrested without a 
warrant61 and charged with a misdemeanor carrying a $1500 maxi-
mum fine and/or a six-month maximum jail term.62 If the violation 
was committed knowingly, a felony conviction can result, carrying a 
$2000 maximum fine and/or a two-year maxirnumjail term.63 
The MBTA, however, does not prevent the "breeding of migra-
tory game birds on farms and preserves and the sale of birds so bred 
under proper regulation for the purpose of increasing the food sup-
ply. "64 Additionally, the MBTA gives the Secretary of the Interior au-
thority to allow indigenous inhabitants of Alaska to take migratory 
birds and their eggs to serve as a food source.65 
The MBTA is enforced by the United States Fish and Wildlife 
Service (FWS).66 The FWS defines "migratory bird" as: 
59 [d. § 703. 
60 [d. § 704(a). 
61 [d. § 706. 
62 [d. § 707. 
63 [d. 
64 16 U.S.C. § 711. 
65 [d. § 712. 
66 50 C.F.R. §§ 10-23 (2003). 
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any bird, whatever its origin and whether or not raised in 
captivity ... [including] mutation or a hybrid of any such 
species, including any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or 
any product, whether or not manufactured, which consists, 
or is composed in whole or part, of any such bird or any 
part, nest, or egg thereof.67 
It then provides a list of migratory bird species thus protected.68 
657 
The FWS also regulates migratory bird hunting, defining "migra-
tory game birds" as "those migratory birds included in the terms of 
conventions between the United States and any foreign country for 
the protection of migratory birds, for which open seasons are pre-
scribed in this part and belong to [the listed families] . "69 
The FWS makes several notable exceptions to the protection of 
migratory birds.7o Enumerated exceptions to permit requirements are 
available for public, scientific, or educational institutions.71 
Specifically, migratory birds and their parts, nests, and eggs, may be 
possessed lawfully without a permit, while importation, exportation, 
purchase, sale, barter, and attempts to do these are still prohibited.72 
The FWS also makes a large exception regarding captive-reared mal-
lard ducks and waterfowl, removing them completely from regula-
tion. 73 Persons may acquire and kill these birds freely as long as they 
are physically marked.74 Subpart C requires permits before any migra-
tory birds may be imported or exported,75 and scientific institutions 
must also apply for a permit for research or educational purposes.76 A 
special purpose permit is given to those who can make a "sufficient 
showing of benefit to the migratory bird resource, important research 
reasons, reasons of human concern for individual birds, or other 
compelling justification."77 Provisions under this subpart also outline 
67Id. § 10.12. 
68 Id. § 10.13. 
69 Id. § 20.11. 
70 See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.12-.14. 
7! Id. § 21.1. 
72 Id. § 21.2. 
73 Id. §§ 21.13-.14. 
74Id. 
75 Id. § 21.21. 
76 50 C.F.R. § 21.23. 
77Id. § 21.27. 
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permit requirements for particular species, such as Canada geese,78 
raptors for falconry,79 and raptors for propagation.so 
C. Judicial Challenges to the Applicability of the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act to Captive-Raised Birds 
The MBTA leaves a curious regulatory vacuum with regard to 
captive-bred migratory birds.8l Migratory birds are captive-bred,82 by 
individuals or wildlife institutions, for diverse reasons: to be kept, used 
as a food source, or commercially sold. Additionally, migratory birds 
are captive-reared so that they may be re-introduced to the wild for 
the purpose of conservation.8!l Many recovery programs by wildlife 
institutions have been successful in the captive-breeding field.84 The 
National Birds of Prey Centre, for example, has captively bred sixty 
species of birds of prey since it opened in 1967.85 Captive-bred birds 
contribute to scientific and technological advances, and help preserve 
endangered birds by recolonizing areas where wild populations have 
disappeared.86 
78 [d. § 21.26. 
79 [d. §§ 21.28-.29. 
80 [d. § 21.30. 
81 [d. §§ 21.13-.14. 
82 Captive-breeding can be achieved through natural breeding or artificial insemina-
tion. Peter Gill, Modern Captive Breeding, THE FALCONERS WEB, at http://www.falconers. 
com/articles/captive_breeding_l! (last visited Apr. 21, 2004). In natural breeding, male 
and female birds are placed together in the breeding chamber and fertile eggs are laid 
after copulation takes place. [d., at http://www.falconers.com/articles/captive_breed-
ing_2/(last visited Apr. 21, 2004). Artificial insemination involves inseminating into the 
female bird the collected male semen, either voluntarily (female presents herself for vol-
untary copulation) or involuntarily (female refuses to stand for voluntary copulation at 
which point a breeder holds and injects semen into the female bird). [d. Mter the eggs are 
laid, they are incubated either naturally, by surrogate parents, or by incubators. [d. at 
http://www.falconers.com/articles/captive_breeding_3/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2004). Incu-
bating eggs naturally refers to leaving the eggs with the parent bird, which poses difficul-
ties when the individual parent breaks eggs either accidentally or intentionally, or refuses 
to sit on the eggs. [d. Another particular concern during hatching time is that some parent 
birds eat their emerging offspring. [d. Hence, many breeders opt to use surrogate parents 
for incubation, usually using parents that are diligent with incubation. [d. Yet another 
method to matching the fertilized eggs is through the use of electromechanical incuba-
tors, such as Brinsea Incubator used by the National Birds of Prey Centre. NAT'L BIRD OF 
PREY CENTRE, at http://www.nbpc.co.uk/breed.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2004). 
83 See, e.g., NATIONAL BIRD OF PREY CENTRE, http://www.nbpc.co.uk/success.htm. 
84 [d. 
811 [d. 
86 Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Falconry: Legal Ownership and Sale of Captive-Bred &ptOTS, 4 
PACE ENVTI.. L. REv. 349, 398 (1987). 
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There has been much debate over whether the MBTA encom-
passes captive-raised birds at all.87 According to the FWS, "migratory 
bird" means "any bird, whatever its origin and whether or not raised in cap-
tivity, which belongs to [a protected] species or which is a mutation or 
a hybrid of any such species .... "88 On the other hand, FWS regula-
tions state that "captive-reared and properly marked mallard ducks, 
alive or dead, or their eggs may be acquired, possessed, sold, traded, 
donated, transported, and disposed of by any person without a per-
mit."89 A similar exception is granted for other captive-reared migra-
tory waterfowl.90 
The issue of whether captive-bred migratory birds are protected 
under the MBTA first arose in Koop v. United States.9l Koop raised mal-
lard ducks at his ranch and invited guests to hunt them on his prem-
ises.92 He was charged with violating sections 703 through 711 of the 
MBTA, which prohibit hunting and attempting to kill migratory 
birds.93 Koop claimed that the mallards that were shot were not wild 
ducks within the meaning of the treaties and the MBTA; rather, they 
were his personal property, since he had raised them.94 Koop, how-
ever, had not confined the ducks so as to prevent them from migrat-
ing and commingling with wild birds.95 Therefore, the court stated 
that Koop lacked possession and control of the mallards because they 
were "free to go and come as they would. "96 
In United States v. Richards, defendant, a breeder of sparrow 
hawks, was charged with violating section 703 of the MBTA, and he 
challenged the applicability of the Act to birds raised in captivity.97 
The court upheld the conviction, emphasizing that the purpose of the 
conventions and the MBTA was to protect migratory birds, making no 
exception for captive migratory birds.98 Thus, the court ruled that the 
MBTA applied to captive-bred falconidae. 99 
87 See, e.g., United States v. Conners, 606 F.2d 269, 270-73 (10th Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Richards, 583 F.2d 491, 491-97 (10th Cir. 1978). 
88 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2003) (emphasis added). 
89 [d. § 21.13. 
90 [d. § 21.14. 
91 296 F.2d 53, 5~1 (8th Cir. 1961). 
92 [d. at 55-56. 
93 [d. at 54. 
94 [d. at 60. 
95 [d. 
96 [d. 
97 583 F.2d 491, 493 (10th Cir. 1978). 
98 [d. at 495. 
99 [d. at 496-97. 
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Just a year later, the court revisited the issue of the applicability of 
the MBTA to captive-related birds. loO In United States v. Conners, the 
court held that the MBTA applied only to wild mallard ducks and not 
to those which were captively-bred,lol In reaching this conclusion, the 
court examined the MBTA and the Mexican and Japanese Conven-
tions to determine whether the MBTA contemplated captive-reared, 
in addition to wild, mallards.I02 The court noted that two of the three 
treaties referred specifically to "wild ducks," including the operative 
Canadian Convention giving rise to the MBTAI03 Therefore, since 
criminal statutes had to be strictly construed, the MBTA did not apply 
to the killing of captive-reared ducks,lo4 Thus, should it be found that 
the ducks killed were "wild," the defendant's conviction under the 
MBTA would be sustained, whereas if they were captive-bred, the 
charges would have to be dismissed. lo5 
Although this distinction between captive-reared and wild mal-
lard ducks turns on the meaning of apparently minor language, and 
although it certainly does not shake the regulatory foundation of the 
MBTA, this Note uses this distinction as an entry point for making 
larger comments about the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. In particular, 
this distinction actually says much about the history, purpose, and 
wildlife ethics of the Act. This distinction, I will argue, demonstrates 
that the same property-based notions that led to the abuse of wildlife 
continue to animate and control the very protection it made neces-
sary. That is, if Pierson v. Post announced in unabashed language that 
wildlife is property, the MBTA suggests in softer regulatory language 
that wildlife is worth protecting because, among other things, its value 
as property is too significant to be squandered. This Note explores the 
utilitarian ethics that underlie a significant moment in conservationist 
history, and ultimately concludes that the ethic that finds animals 
worth protecting because of their value "to us" is the type of pragma-
tism and compromise that holds such a movement back. 
100 United Statesv. Conners, 606 F.2d 269, 270-73 (10th Cir. 1979). 
101 [d. at 273. 
102 [d. at 271-72. 
105 [d. at 271. 
104 [d. 
105 [d. at 273. 
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II. ANALYSIS: THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT AND PROTECTING 
"PROPERTY" 
A. Wildlife as Property 
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act stands as a landmark among early 
federal efforts to protect the nation's wildlife. 106 It declares that "it 
shall be unlawful at any time, by any means or in any manner, to pur-
sue, hunt, take, capture [or] kill ... any migratory bird, or any part, 
nest, or egg of any such birds, included in the terms of the [conven-
tion] between the United States and Great Britain ... the United 
Mexican States ... the Government of Japan ... and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics .... "107 Its text is as dramatic as it is direct: 
migratory birds, previously brought to the point of decimation by the 
country's indifference towards their welfare, were now to be extended 
nearly unqualified protection as part of a massive international ef-
fort. IOB Gone were the days when the nation's birds were "massacred 
for the sheer hell of it";109 gone, too, were the days when early Ameri-
cans could insist on their right "to blast away at any species affording 
food, profit, or sport. "llO Instead, the Act told Americans and other 
nations who were willing to listen that migratory birds were not a 
"bottomless pit"lll from which to take, use, kill, and consume indis-
criminately.ll2 So striking was the commitment made to the nation's 
migratory birds that some commentators have offered the Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act and similar wildlife regulation as undeniable proof 
that "[w]ildlife in early America was viewed quite differently than it is 
today."ll3 These regulatory efforts, it is argued, brought America out 
ofthe prehistory of its protection ofwildlife. 114 
While it is certainly true that the MBTA and similar statutes 
worked a significant change in the nation's regulation of wildlife, it is 
something entirely different to say that they also worked a significant 
106 George C. Coggins & William H. Hensely, Constitutional Limits on Federal Power to Pro-
tect and Manage Wildlife: Is the Endangered SPecies Act Endangered 1, 61 IOWA L. REV. 1099, 1110 
(1976). 
107 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2000). 
108 See id. §§ 703-712. 
109 Corcoran & Colbourn, supra note 14, at 359. 
110 Perkins, supra note 33, at 824. 
111 Lombardi, supra note 9, at 343. 
112 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 703. 
m Lombardi, supra note 9, at 343. 
114 ld. at 344. 
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change in the nation's conceptualization of wildlife.ll5 Indeed, it is 
even .more difficult to posit that a so-called conceptual change actually 
motivated the passage of the Act.1l6 This Note argues that it is not be-
cause wildlife in modern America is viewed "quite differently" than it 
was before the MBTA became law. Rather, it is because modern Amer-
ica has continued to view wildlife quite similarly to early America that 
this Act and others like it exist. That is, while the MBTA may an-
nounce a move away from the crude conceptualization of animals as 
"property," the protection it now seeks to afford migratory birds con-
tinues to be premised partly upon their value as property.1l7 If birds 
are now worth protecting, they are worth protecting because humans 
find them useful}18 Thus, America's conceptualization of how to use 
this property may have changed, but our fundamental perception of 
wildlife as property has remained unaltered. To flesh out this argu-
ment, one need only examine the terms of the conventions, statutory 
language, history, and relevant caselaw, with a specific focus on the 
curious distinction between wild and captive-bred mallard ducks.1l9 
B. Language of the Conventions Preceding the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
The very language of the MBTA's regulatory scheme suggests 
that it is designed to protect birds only to the extent necessary to pre-
serve their value or utility to humans. 120 The language of the four 
conventions, for example, reveals that the protection afforded to mi-
gratory birds was essentially protection afforded to a resource.121 The 
Proclamation to the Canadian Convention states that migratory birds 
ought to be protected because "[m]any of these species are of great 
value as a source of food or in destroying insects which are injurious 
to forests and forage plants on the public domain, as well as to agri-
cultural crops."122 Hence, both the United States and Canada must 
regulate the "indiscriminate slaughter" of these birds to insure their 
preservation since they are "useful to man or are harmless. "123 Not 
115 See discussion, infra Parts II.B-E. 
1I6Id. 
117 Id. 
1I8Id. 
1I9Id. 
120 See generally, e.g., Mexican Convention, supra note 37; Canadian Convention, supra 
note 18. 
121 See generally Russian Convention, supra note 39; Japanese Convention, supra note 38; 
Mexican Convention, supra note 37; Canadian Convention, supra note 18. 
122 Canadian Convention, supra note 18, at 1702. 
123Id. 
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only does this language condone "indiscriminate" killing of birds, it 
also characterizes them as a commodity useful to humans.124 It is their 
value as a useful commodity that earns migratory birds significant 
protection under the Canadian Convention.125 
Similarly, the Mexican Convention also declares it necessary to 
"employ adequate measures which will permit a rational utilization of 
migratory birds for the purposes of ... food .... "126 The Convention 
acknowledges the recreational and economic values of migratory 
birds and affords them protection on that basis, "[i]n order that the 
species may not be exterminated ... it is right and proper to protect 
birds ... for the purposes of sport, ... commerce and industry."127 
Hence, the Mexican Convention established closed seasons during 
certain periods of the year in which "taking of migratory birds, their 
nests or eggs, as well as their transportation or sale, alive or dead, [of] 
their products or parts" was prohibited.128 
The Japanese and Russian Conventions likewise extended protec-
tion on the basis of recreational value, establishing open hunting sea-
sons and permitting requirements. l29 The Japanese Convention pro-
vided that "[t]he taking of the migratory birds or their eggs shall be 
prohibited ... [except] during open hunting seasons, "130 and the 
Russian Convention stated that "[e]ach Contracting Party shall pro-
hibit the taking of migratory birds ... [but] [e]xception to these pro-
hibitions may be made on the basis of laws, decrees or regulations of 
the respective Contracting Parties ... [f]or the establishment of hunt-
ing seasons. "131 This language reveals that migratory birds were not 
placed off-limits under the conventions; their uses were simply limited 
to ensure that their value as food and sport would be protected for 
years to come.132 
The language of the Japanese Convention clearly indicates that 
migratory birds serve additional uses: they are a "natural resource of 
great value for recreational, aesthetic, scientific, and economic pur-
124 [d. 
125 See id. 
126 Mexican Convention, supra note 37, at 1311-12 (emphasis added). 
127 Id. at 1312. 
128 [d. 
129 Russian Convention, supra note 39, at 4652; Japanese Convention, supra note 38, at 
3333. 
1!1O Japanese Convention, supra note 38, at 3333. 
131 Russian Convention, supra note 39, at 4651-52. 
U2 See id. 
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poses. "I!!!! The Russian Convention goes further, comprehensively 
proclaiming that "migratory birds are a natural resource of great sci-
entific, economic, aesthetic, cultural, educational, recreational and 
ecological value .... "134 While the protection of the aesthetic value of 
wildlife suggests the notion of intrinsic value, even aesthetic reasons 
for protecting birds recognize an interaction between humans and 
nature that ultimately has human sensibilities at its core.l!I5 Acknowl-
edgment that migratory birds are pleasing to look at is not a funda-
mental departure from the proposition that they are also pleasing to 
eat.I!!6 
Romantic love for wilderness that developed during the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries provides an understanding of the aes-
thetic purposes wildlife served.I!!7 City dwellers increasingly began to 
value their relationship with the natural world: 
[t]housands of tired, nerve-shaken, over-civilized people are 
beginning to find out that ... wildness is a necessity .... 
Awakening from the stupefying effects of the vice of over-
industry and the deadly apathy of luxury, they are trying as 
best as they can to mix and enrich their little ongoings with 
those of Nature, and to get rid of rust and disease.I!!8 
Writers like Jack London and Maximilian Foster glorified the invigo-
rating savagery of wild animals, and wilderness was seen as a commod-
ity in which humans could regain their "lost vitality. "I!!9 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, on the other hand, saw unspoiled nature 
as a "conduit through which humans could establish contact with 
higher reality. "140 Like Emerson, Henry David Thoreau expressed in-
terest in the spiritual gains that wildlife provided, and recorded the 
wild animals he encountered in the hopes that it would yield spiritual 
knowledge.I4I In Walden, Thoreau wrote that contact with wildlife was 
"to make my life more rich and eventful. "142 Both Emerson and Tho-
us Japanese Convention, supra note 38, at 3331. 
1M Russian Convention, supra note 39, at 4649-50. 
1M Seeid. 
U6 Seeid. 
IS7 MIGHETfO, supra note I, at 3. 
ISS [d. at 3-4 (quoting JOHN MUIR, OUR NATIONAL PARKS (Houghton Mifflin 1901». 
U9 [d. at 4. 
140 [d. at 3. 
141 THE HEART OF ThOREAU's JOURNALS 4 (Odell Shepard ed., Houghton Mifflin 
1927). 
142 [d. 
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reau believed that nature was "emblematic of the spiritual world," and 
found an aesthetic use for them. 143 Hence, even the aesthetic values of 
wildlife are often based on a human-centered interest in how it can 
enrich our spiritual health. 144 
Beyond their traditional values as food sources, sport, and aes-
thetic symbols of wildlife, the conventions also recognized the scientific 
value of migratory birds.145 Article VI of the Canadian Convention 
states that the prohibition against taking migratory birds does not apply 
to takings that may be scientifically justified.l46 More specifically, the 
Canadian Convention provides that "the shipment or export of migra-
tory birds or their eggs from any State or Province ... shall be prohib-
ited except for scientific ... purposes."147 The Mexican, Japanese, and 
Russian Conventions adopted similar exemptions for scientific re-
search.148 For example, the Mexican Convention requires "[t]he estab-
lishment of closed seasons, which will prohibit in certain periods of the 
year the taking of migratory birds, their nests or eggs, as well as their 
transportation or sale, alive or dead, [and] their products or parts, ex-
cept when proceeding ... for scientific purposes."149 Likewise, the 
Japanese Convention provided that "[t]he taking of the migratory birds 
or their eggs shall be prohibited ... [but] [e]xceptions to the prohibi-
tion of taking may be permitted in accordance with the laws and regu-
lations of the respective Contracting Parties ... [f]or scientific ... pur-
poses not inconsistent with the objectives of this Convention."150 Using 
similar language, the Russian Convention declared that an "[e]xcep-
tion to these prohibitions [of taking migratory birds] may be made on 
the basis of laws, decrees or regulations of the respective Contracting 
Parties ... for scientific ... purposes. "151 Indeed, the Mexican Conven-
tion expanded the exemption to include museum uses,152 and the 
Japanese Convention broadly provided for "other specific purposes not 
14~ [d. 
144 See id. 
145 See Canadian Convention, supra note 18, at 1704. 
146Id. 
147 [d. 
148 Russian Convention, supra note 39, at 4651-53; Japanese Convention, supra note 
38, at 3333-34; Mexican Convention, supra note 37, at 1312-13. 
149 Mexican Convention, supra note 37, at 1312. 
150 Japanese Convention, supra note 38, at 3333. 
151 Russian Convention, supra note 39, at 4652. 
152 Mexican Convention, supra note 37, at 1312. 
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inconsistent with the objectives of this Convention, "153 as did the Rus-
sian Convention.l54 
When the utility of migratory birds does not outweigh other hu-
man interests, the conventions permit further exemptions for taking 
the otherwise protected birds.l55 For instance, migratory birds may be 
killed when they "become seriously injurious to the agricultural or 
other interests in any particular community. "156 The Canadian Con-
vention granted freedom to kill migratory birds that "under extraor-
. dinary conditions, may become seriously injurious to agriculture or 
other interests in any particular community."157 The Mexican Conven-
tion likewise provided this exemption "when [migratory birds] be-
come injurious to agriculture and constitute plagues. "158 The Russian 
Convention grants an exemption in one broad stroke, allowing the 
killing of migratory birds "[f] or the purpose of protecting against in-
jury to persons or property. "159 These exemptions demonstrate that 
migratory birds seen as reasonable threats to valuable property enjoy 
substantially less protection and deference than migratory birds con-
sidered valuable property themselves.1oo 
C. Language of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
The regulatory economy of apportioning protection according to 
utility is also at work in the MBTA itself.161 Section 704 of Title 16 
grants the Secretary of the Interior deferential power to allow "hunt-
ing, taking, capture, killing, possession, sale, purchase, shipment, 
transportation, carriage, or export of any such bird, or any part, nest, 
or egg thereof" after "having due regard to the zones of temperature 
and to the distribution, abundance, economic value, breeding habits, 
and times and lines of migratory flight of such birds. "162 Thus, the 
MBTA does not contemplate the wholesale protection of migratory 
155Japanese Convention, supra note 38, at 3333. 
154 Russian Convention, supra note 39, at 4651-52 ("Exception to these prohibitions 
may be made ... for ... other specific purposes not inconsistent with the principles of this 
Convention."). 
ISS See, e.g., Canadian Convention, supra note 18, at 1704. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. (emphasis added). 
158 Mexican Convention, supra note 37, at 1312-13 (emphasis added). 
159 Russian Convention, supra note 39, at 4652. 
160 See Russian Convention, supra note 39, at 4651-53; Mexican Convention, supra note 
37, at 1312; Canadian Convention, supra note 18, at 1704. 
161 See Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2000). 
162 Id. § 704. 
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birds.163 Despite the strong and stark language of protectionism, it 
allows large exceptions when birds can either afford not to be pro-
tected, or when humans cannot afford them to be protected.164 In-
deed, it is the original premise of birds as property that permits this 
delegation of power to the Secretary of the Interior in the first place: 
"[m]igratory birds are subject to ownership of the people of the states 
in their collective sovereign capacity," and thus regulations made by 
the Secretary qualifY as a "valid regulation of 'commerce.'''165 
Additionally, the legacy of viewing wildlife as property to be 
owned and controlled is apparent in the MBTA's exemption for mi-
gratory birds raised in captivity.1OO The Act provides that, "[n]othing 
in this subchapter shall be construed to prevent the ... sale of birds 
so bred [on farms and preserves] ... for the purpose of increasing 
the food supply. "167 This language suggests that captive-bred migra-
tory birds are property subject to the control and disposal of breeders, 
not to be tampered with by the ACt. 168 Similarly, if the MBTA does not 
desire to tamper with the property rights of farmers, it also does not 
purport to tamper with the indigenous use of migratory birds. It states 
that "the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to issue such regula-
tions as may be necessary to assure that the taking of migratory birds 
and the collection of their eggs, by the indigenous inhabitants of the 
State of Alaska, shall be permitted for their own nutritional and other 
essential needs. "169 The MBTA not only creates or refines property 
interests in migratory birds, it protects those rights already clearly in 
existence.170 
The legislative history of the MBTA boldly suggests the role prop-
erty rights and interests played in shaping the vision of MBTA's protec-
tionism and rationale. l7l Congress clearly saw in migratory birds food, 
sport, and aesthetic enjoyment.172 For instance, one senator was con-
cerned that unregulated hunting of migratory birds would hinder the 
protection of American agriculture and forestry: "[e]nough birds will 
keep every insect off of every tree in America, and if you will quit shoot-
163 See id. 
164 [d. 
166 Cerritos Gun Club v. HalI, 96 F.2d 620, 620 (9th Cir. 1938) (emphasis added). 
166 See 16 U.S.C. § 711. 
167 [d. 
168 See id. 
169 [d. § 712. 
170 See id. 
171 See, e.g., 56 CONGo REC. 7447 (1918). 
172 See, e.g., 55 CONGo REC. 4816 (1917). 
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ing them they will do it."173 Pothunters were seen as villains whose be-
havior the MBTA must address and regulate, lest "proper" hunters run 
out of targets. 174 Hence, while "[t]his law is aimed at the professional 
po thunter, "175 hunting according to the rules of sport was embraced by 
one representative: "God made woodpeckers, meadow larks, wild 
ducks, and bobolinks for boys to shoot .... [I] t makes better soldiers of 
them, if they learn to shoot. "176 Indeed, many congressmen either sug-
gested or wanted confirmation that the true purpose of the MBTA was 
to preserve the sport of hunting for generations to come. Interestingly, 
the underlying concern for the prosperity of hunting was also used to 
criticize the Act, with some congressmen going so far as to suggest that 
not only was the Act not aimed at protecting the birds, it was also not 
aimed at protecting hunting in general, but only the elite practice of it. 
Many congressmen dismissed the MBTA as expressing the "desire to 
maintain a steady supply of game animals for the upper classes."177 In 
the words of one representative, 
[t] he real purpose of this bill, so far as it applies to the game 
birds, is not to protect the birds, is not to give them life, but 
to fix it so that the ragged boys, the people far away in the 
country who have not bird dogs-to fix it so that the com-
mon people of the country can not get their fair share of the 
game and so that only those who are able to afford game 
preserves and fancy equipment for hunting and all the 
paraphernalia that goes with it.17S 
What was common to this discourse and debate about the MBTA 
was that it was not extending help to birds for their sake, but for peo-
ple's sake.179 Hunters were among those people "protected" by the 
Act, and so were weekend admirers of wildlife. lso The issue of aes-
thetic appreciation of migratory birds appears frequently in debates 
about the Act. lSI One representative admitted, for instance, that 
"[m]y admiration for our little friends of the air makes me unfriendly 
mId. 
174 [d. 
175 55 CONGo REG. 4402 (1917). 
176 56 CONGo REG. 7447 (1918). 
177 United States v. Moon Lake Electric Ass'n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1082 (D. Colo. 
1999). 
178 56 CONGo REG. 7364 (1918). 
179 See id. 
180 See, e.g., 56 CONGo REG. 7357, 7447 (1918). 
181 See, e.g., id. at 7357. 
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to the habit of killing off these winged visitors .... "182 Similarly, an-
other representative added, "[iJf we are going to have a treaty about 
migratory birds, let us have some place where they can come and re-
main safely and be a pleasure and companions. "183 
The regulations set forth by the FVVS under the MBTA reproduce 
this utilitarian protectionist scheme at the ground level of 
micromanagement. l84 True to congressional intent, the FVVS permits 
the hunting of migratory birds by those who identify themselves as 
hunters. l85 The FVVS regulates the methods of hunting,l86 outlines the 
hours during which hunting can take place,187 the limits on the num-
ber of birds a person may take per day,l88 and requires that any birds 
so taken be tagged to claim their possession.189 Likewise, a taxidermist 
may "[r]eceive, transport, hold in custody or possession, mount or 
otherwise prepare, migratory birds, and their parts, nests, or eggs, 
and return them to another," as well as "[slell properly marked, 
captive-reared migratory waterfowl which he has lawfully acquired 
and mounted," as long as he keeps accurate records of such 
operations. 190 
The FVVS and its regulations realize the scientific value of migra-
tory birds as well. 191 While a general permit is required for any person 
to "take, possess, import, export, transport, sell, purchase, barter, or 
offer for sale, purchase or barter, any migratory bird, or the parts, 
nests, eggs of such bird, "192 the FVVS allows the taking of migratory 
birds by "public, scientific, or educational institutions" without a per-
mit. 193 In addition, individuals wishing to take or possess migratory 
birds for scien tific research or educational purposes can apply for a 
scientific collecting permit.194 Finally, the FVVS more broadly allows 
for the taking of migratory birds when there exists "important re-
search reasons" or simply "other compellingjustification."195 
182 ld. 
183 ld. at 7458. 
184 See 50 C.F.R. §§ 20.1-21.43 (2002). 
185 ld. §§ 20.l (b), 20.20(b). 
186 ld. § 20.21. 
187 ld. § 20.23. 
188 ld. § 20.24. 
189 ld. § 20.36. 
190 50 C.F.R. § 21.24. 
191 ld. §§ 21.1-23. 
192 ld. § 21.11. 
193 ld. § 21.1. 
194 ld. § 21.23. 
195 ld. § 21.27. 
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Like the language of the conventions suggest, the MBTA indi-
cates that when migratory birds become injurious to human interests, 
they are no longer protected.1OO Thus, the FWS allows persons to take 
migratory birds for depredation control purposes. Upon evidence 
that migratory game birds have accumulated so "as to cause or [be] 
about to cause serious damage to agricultural, horticultural, and fish 
cultural interests, the Director is authorized to issue ... a depredation 
order to permit the killing of such birds. "197 Killed migratory birds 
can then be turned over to "charitable or other worthy institutions for 
use as food, "198 or donated to "public museums or public scientific 
and educational institutions for exhibition, scientific, or educational 
purposes. "199 Their utility is required to be recyded.2OO Some species, 
like crows, all grackles, and magpies, may be killed if they pose a 
health hazard or other nuisance to humans.201 
D. The Curious Distinction in Focus 
Curiously, the FWS allows any person to take "captive-reared" 
mallard ducks and other captive-reared migratory waterfowl without a 
permit.202 Hence, "[c]aptive-reared and properly marked mallard 
ducks, alive or dead, or their eggs may be acquired, possessed, sold, 
traded, donated, transported, and disposed of by any person without 
a permit,"203 while "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to 
permit the taking of live mallard ducks or their eggs from the wild. "204 
This language suggests that while captive-raised mallard ducks are the 
property of the breeder, wild mallard ducks merit normal MBTA pro-
tection.205 Unlike the protection afforded wild mallard ducks, captive-
reared mallard ducks may be killed, "in any number, at any time or 
place, by any means except shooting ... [unless] [s]uch birds may be 
196 50 C.F.R. § 21.42. 
197 [d. 
198 [d. § 21.41(c)(4). 
199 [d. § 21.42(c). 
200 [d. 
201 [d. § 21.43. 
202 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.13, 21.14. (This Note refers to the exception as "curious· because 
nothing in the text or history of the Act offers any rationale why such an exception should 
take place here. This curiosity has not been lost on the courts, where no satisfying explana-
tion of this distinction other than the fact that the text seems to point that way has been 
offered). 
205 [d. § 21.13. 
204 [d. § 21.13(a). 
205 See id. 
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killed ... within the confines of any premises operated as a shooting 
preserve ... or ... by any person for bona fide dog training or field 
trial purposes. "206 
Similarly, any person may lawfully acquire, possess, and transport 
captive-reared and properly marked migratory waterfowl without a 
permit.207 These lawfully possessed waterfowl may be killed, except by 
shooting, unless they can be shot in accordance with all applicable 
hunting regulations governing the taking of like species from the 
wild.208 Thus, the distinction between captive and wild mallard ducks 
suggests the modesty of the MBTA, as it will not interfere with prop-
erty interests that have already been asserted in the paradigmatic Pier-
son v. Post manner-ducks already reduced to possession and control 
are property interests not to be tampered with. 209 That is, the regula-
tory logic of the MBTA preserves preexisting individual property rights 
which were already clearly asserted, while creating new property rights 
in the general public, such as generations of hunters and scientific 
institutions, that the Act then seeks to regulate and maintain. 
This distinction between mallard ducks is curious because it is 
found nowhere else in the text of the MBTA. No other species of mi-
gratory birds is treated this way, and the logic of splintering mallards 
into wild and captive categories is confined to one sentence. In fact, 
the one word "wild" alone suggests that a splintering is supposed to 
take place. Evidence of the distinction can be traced to the language 
of the Canadian and Mexican Conventions.210 The Canadian Conven-
tion inserted the modifier "wild" before ducks when stating that pro-
tected migratory birds included "Anatidae or waterfowl, including ... 
wild ducks. "211 Nowhere else does the Canadian Convention insert 
''wild'' before protected migratory bird species, except wild pigeons.212 
The Mexican Convention makes this distinction more subtly, extend-
ing its protective reach only to "wild" ducks "from the tenth of March 
to the first of September. "213 This language suggests rights of posses-
sion and control over ducks that happen to be domestic, again hint-
206Id. § 21.13(d). 
207 Id. § 21.14. 
208 50 C.F.R. § 21.14(d). 
209 See id. §§ 21.13, 21.14. 
210 Mexican Convention, supra note 37, at 1313; Canadian Convention, supra note 18, 
at 1702-03. 
211 Canadian Conven tion, supra note 18, at 1702-03 (emphasis added). 
212 Canadian Convention, supra note 18. 
213 Mexican Convention, supra note 37, at 1313. 
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ing that to not be wild is already to have been possessed and owned.214 
As mentioned above, the MBTA does not interfere with property 
rights clearly established.215 
Given the subtlety with which the MBTA and its predecessor con-
ventions work this distinction, it is not surprising that clarif)ring the 
distinction has been left to the workings of the common law.216 Com-
mon law addressing whether the MBTA extends its wings over captive-
bred migratory birds also indicates that the MBTA's protection ends 
where clear assertions of property rights begin.217 In Koop v. United 
States, for example, Koop had created artificial ponds on his ranch, 
using them to feed and raise mallard ducks. 218 Over the years, Koop 
would discontinue feeding the ducks before opening day of the hunt-
ing season and would invite fellow hunters to his property for duck 
hunting.219 The ducks that were not shot or captured migrated in the 
fall. 220 Koop estimated that hunters shot approximately twenty to 
twenty-five percent of the ducks he raised, and the rest disappeared.221 
During one day of hunting, a number of mallard ducks swooped 
over and into his pond.222 Koop admitted that he was usually unable 
to distinguish his mallard ducks from wild ones.223 He simply asserted 
that the mallards were his property until they migrated from his 
ranch.224 The court, however, emphasized the importance of the dis-
tinction between "wild" and "captive-bred" mallards, insisting that this 
distinction could not so easily be brushed aside.225 If the mallards 
which were shot were wild, "the verdict was not only supported by the 
evidence but those defendants [the hunters] and Dr. Koop were guilty 
beyond any doubt. "226 
214 See id. 
215 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712. 
216 See, e.g., United States v. Conners, 606 F.2d 269, 270-73 (10th Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Richards, 583 F.2d 491, 495-97 (10th Cir. 1978); Koop v. United States, 296 F.2d 
53,54-61 (8th Cir. 1961). 
217 See, e.g., Conners, 606 F.2d at 270-72; Koop, 296 F.2d at 54-61; see also Richards, 583 
F.2d at 495-97 (finding no distinction between wild and captive-bred raptors, but only be-
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In considering the importance of this distinction, the court relied 
on the purposeful insertion of the term "wild" before "ducks" in the 
list of protected migratory birds in the Canadian Convention.227 
Moreover, the court found in this word dispositive proof that the 
MBTA did not apply to captive-bred mallard ducks.228 It noted, 
[i]t is common knowledge that ducks, and particularly mal-
lard ducks, lend themselves to being tamed or domesticated 
and that ducks generally found in most farmyards trace their 
ancestry back to the wild and untamed ducks with whose 
protection and care the Migratory Bird Treaties and regula-
tions were concerned. Concededly, however, the law was not 
meant for, nor may it regulate or control the use of, such 
tamed or domesticated ducks. 229 
Rather, once persons exercised possession and control, birds be-
came property; indeed, "[i]n determining when ... 'wild' birds are 
no longer considered 'wild,' courts and writers have made the major 
consideration one of possession and con trol. "230 
The court explained that '" [t] here is no property in wild animals 
until they have been subjected to the control of man. If one secures 
and tames them, they are his property; if he does not tame them, they 
are still his, so long as they are kept confined and under his con-
trol. '''231 
Hence, in language strikingly similar to Pierson v. Post, the court 
declared that once people exercise control over wildlife, this posses-
sion marks the "beginning of ownership," and thereafter the MBTA 
has limited application.232 Since possession is never permanent, nei-
ther is person's property interest in wildlife: if the animals "return to 
their wild state, the property right ceases. "233 Hence, the controlling 
issue in Koop became whether Koop had asserted sufficient possession 
and control over the killed mallards so that they could be considered 
his property rather than wildlife protected under the MBTA.234 Even 
though Koop fed and raised the mallards, he failed to assert "posses-
227 [d. 
228 [d. at 59. 
229 [d. 
2!!O Koop. 296 F.2d at 59. 
231 [d. (quoting 2 COOLEY. TORTS 838 (3d ed. 1906)). 
232 [d. 
233 [d. at 59-60. 
2!14 [d. at 58-59. 
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sion and control" over them because they could simply fly from one 
pond to another and away from Koop's ranch without interference.235 
Additionally, the fact that neither Koop nor anyone else could distin-
guish between raised mallards and wild mallards illustrated that noth-
ing prevented the commingling of the captive-reared mallards with 
wild mallards.236 Hence, Koop failed to satisfY the court that he had 
"possession" of the ducks in question.237 As a negative implication, 
though, the court was content to withhold the MBTA's protection 
whenever "possession and control" could be established.238 Captive-
reared mallard ducks were outside the MBTA's sanctuary.239 
The distinction between captive-reared and wild mallard ducks 
was not reexamined until seventeen years later in United States v. Ri-
chards. 240 There, defendant Richards, a breeder of sparrow hawks, was 
charged with violating section 703 of the MBTA, and challenged the 
applicability of the MBTA to birds raised in captivity.241 In 1969, Pro-
fessor Richards acquired his sparrow hawks, a protected species, un-
der a valid state permit before controlling federal regulations ex-
isted.242 When federal protection of migratory birds was extended to 
include sparrow hawks, the permit was cancelled and the Bureau of 
Fish and Wildlife warned him that the sale of sparrow hawks was ille-
ga1.243 The court relied on the words of the FWS, emphasizing that 
migratory birds are defined to include any wild bird "whether raised 
in captivity or not. "244 Additionally, the court stated that the MBTA, 
read as a whole, refuted the defendant's contention that captive birds 
are excluded from the MBTA because they are not wild migratory 
birds and may not be hunted.245 
As to the defendant's claim that the proscription against captive-
raised birds discourages propagation and thus thwarts the intent of 
Congress to preserve migratory birds, the court noted that 16 U.S.C. 
§ 704 authorizes regulations to determine to what extent sale may be 
235 Id. at 60. 
236 Koop, 296 F.2d. at 60. 
237 [d. at 60-61. 
238 [d. at 59-60. 
239 [d. at 60-61. 
240 583 F.2d 491, 493 (10th Cir. 1978). 
241 [d. 
242 [d. 
243 [d. 
244 [d. at 493-94 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (1978)). 
245 [d. at 494-95 (citing 16 U .S.C. §§ 703, 704, 707 (1976)). 
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permitted.246 Additionally, the regulations provide for possession and 
propagation of migratory birds by public, educational, and scientific 
organizations.247 In defense of this reading of the MBTA, the court 
stated that whether captive birds migrate is immaterial, since the cru-
cial question is "whether the sparrow hawks which defendant sold be-
long to a species or group that migrate, not whether the particular 
birds migrate. "248 Additionally, the court held that the wording of the 
regulation to include captive-raised birds under the MBTA was rea-
sonably related to the Act's purpose of protecting wild birds.249 The 
reasonableness of the regulation was apparent because of the 
"difficulty in distinguishing birds raised in captivity from others of the 
species. "250 
From a practical standpoint, the court noted that enforcing the 
MBTA would be difficult if a defendant could readily claim that a bird 
was raised in captivity.251 Thus, the court affirmed the conviction and 
ruled that the MBTA applies to captive-bred birds.252 Unlike the Koop 
court, this court did not theorize the possibility that a potential de-
fendant would euer be able to satisfy a court that a bird in question was 
in fact "possessed and controlled. "253 The practical difficulty of draw-
ing that distinction was considered much more important by the Ri-
chards court.254 Thus, the Richards court interpreted the MBTA to be 
bolder and less forgiving than its text would suggest.255 The implica-
tion is, then, that if the purpose of the MBTA is to protect migratory . 
birds, courts should err on the side of protection.256 
Just a year later, the court revisited the issue in United States v. 
Connors.257 Here, the court denied the applicability of the MBTA to 
captive-reared migratory birds, holding that it applied only to mallard 
ducks that were wild.258 Here, the defendant was charged with unlaw-
fully hunting, killing, and attempting to kill migratory birds in viola-
246 Richards, 583 F.2d at 494-95. 
247 Id. at 496. 
248Id. at 495 (citing United States v. Lumpkin, 276 F. 580, 583 (1921». 
249Id. 
250 Id. 
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252 Richards, 583 F.2d at 496-97. 
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257 606 F.2d 269, 270-73 (10th Cir. 1979). 
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tion of the MBTA.259 During a hunting dog "field trial, "260 a group of 
ducks entered the area, disrupting the competition, whereupon the 
defendant shot and killed the ducks to expedite the field trials.261 
Like the Koop court, in assessing the legality of the defendant's 
actions, the Connors court examined the MBTA and similar Mexican 
and Japanese Conventions to determine whether the MBTA contem-
plated captive-reared in addition to wild mallard ducks.262 The court 
concluded that insofar as two of the three treaties, including the op-
erative Canadian Convention giving rise to the MBTA, referred 
specifically to "wild ducks, "263 and insofar as criminal statutes had to 
be strictly construed, the MBTA did not apply to the killing of captive-
reared ducks.264 Thus, the court held that if the ducks killed were 
"wild," the defendant's conviction under the MBTA would be sus-
tained; whereas if the ducks were captive-bred, the charges would 
have to be dismissed. 265 In drawing a distinction between wild and 
captive ducks under the MBTA, the court was careful to distinguish 
this case from Richards.266 It noted that the birds involved in Richards 
were from the Falconidae family, for which the conventions did not 
specifically distinguish between "wild" and "captive-reared" in the 
manner that they did for ducks.267 While the Richards court saw fit to 
err on the side of protection, the Connors court was uncomfortable 
doing so when that meant imposing criminal sanctions on a defen-
dant. 
E. Scope of the Protection Afforded /Jy the Migratory Bird Treaty Act: Distinct 
Treatment for Wild and Captive-bred Birds 
That courts have interpreted the MBTA to distinguish between 
wild and captive-bred migratory birds, bestowing protection on the 
259 Id. at 270-7l. 
260 Id. at 270. The field trials consisted of throwing mallard ducks or other birds into a 
pond located at the arsenal whereupon trained dogs were released to retrieve the birds. Id. 
261Id. 
262 Id. at 271-72. 
263 The Canadian Convention defined protected migratory game birds to include "wild 
ducks," and the Mexican Convention established a closed season only for "wild ducks." 
Mexican Convention, supra note 37, at 1312-13; Canadian Convention, supra note 18, at 
1702-03. 
264 Conners, 606 F.2d at 271. 
265 Id. at 273. 
266 Id. at 272 nA. 
267 Id. "The unique fact that the treaties and regulations specifically refer to 'wild 
ducks' rather than simply 'ducks,' distinguishes this case from Richards." Id. 
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former and turning a blind eye on the latter, draws an even starker 
contrast between the two groups when cast in light of the fact that the 
MBTA regulates bird killing, the time when birds are killed, and the 
particular motives required for legal killing of protected birds.268 The 
fact is that the MBTA protects and regulates the taking of wild, and 
thus "non-property," migratory birds much more closely than migra-
tory birds considered "property. "269 For instance, the MBTA's prohibi-
tion on commercially selling "non-property" bird parts extend to 
those lawfully killed before the passage of the MBTA.270 In Andrus v. 
Allard, Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, emphasized that the 
prohibition of commercial transactions in parts of protected birds was 
without regard to when those birds were originally taken.271 In inter-
preting the intent of Congress, Justice Brennan noted that "[w]hen 
Congress wanted an exemption from the statutory prohibition, it pro-
vided so in unmistakable terms. "272 Since nothing in the MBTA re-
quires an exception for the sale of preexisting artifacts, the Court 
found that the structure and context of the MBTA demanded that 
commercial prohibitions be applied to parts of protected birds law-
fully acquired before the enactment of the MBTA.273 Additionally, the 
court in United States v. Moon Lake Electric Association noted that Con-
gress did not intend to confine the prohibition of bird killing activi-
ties to those of traditional hunting.274 Rather, the court relied on the 
language and the regulations of the MBTA, which prohibits the act of 
"killing" in addition to the acts of hunting, capturing, shooting, and 
trapping, to show that Congress intended to prohibit any activities 
that killed protected birds.275 That the MBTA, as the court pointed 
out, does not discriminate concerning the manner of captivity, injury, 
or death of its protected birds supported this assertion.276 Similarly, 
the Moon Lake court rejected the contention that the MBTA prohibits 
only intentional taking or killing of protected birds, noting that viola-
268 See discussion supra Part II.D. 
269 See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard. 444 U.S. 51. 51-68 (1979). 
27°Id. at 56,61-62. 
271 Id. at 60. 
272Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 711 (1976). which provides: "[nlothing in this subchapter 
shall be construed to prevent the breeding of migratory game birds on farms and pre-
serves and the sale of so bred under proper regulation for the purpose of increasing the 
food supply."). 
275Id. at 60-61. 
274 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070,1075 (D. Colo. 1999). 
275 Id. 
276 Id. For instance. the MBTA prohibits the sale of protected birds regardless of how 
such birds are collected. trapped, or killed. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a). 
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tions of the MBTA are strict liability crimes: "it is not necessary to 
prove that a defendant violated the Migratory Bird Treaty Act with 
specific intent or guilty knowledge. "277 Accordingly, the MBTA explic-
itly proscribes misdemeanor penalties to any persons violating the 
MBTA or any of its conventions, regardless of specific intent or 
knowledge.278 Persons who "knowingly" take protected birds in viola-
tion of the MBTA and its conventions, on the other hand, are guilty of 
a felony.279 
Conversely, the MBTA appears to no longer protect birds when 
they are already serving property interests.280 The language of the 
MBTA explicitly provides for the sale of captive-bred migratory game 
birds for the purpose of increasing food supply,281 the FWS exempts 
captive-reared mallard ducks and other captive-reared migratory wa-
terfowl from protection,282 and courts accordingly decline to protect 
captive-reared mallard ducks.283 More specifically, the MBTA provides 
that "[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to prevent the 
breeding of migratory game birds on farms and preserves and the 
sale of birds so bred under proper regulation for the purpose of in-
creasing the food supply. "284 Hence, the MBTA explicitly carves out an 
exception in its prohibitions against selling protected migratory birds 
to those that are captive-bred.285 Additionally, the FWS has two provi-
sions indicating that the "taking" of captive-reared mallard ducks and 
other waterfowl is permitted.286 It provides that "[c]aptive-reared and 
properly marked mallard ducks, alive or dead, or their eggs may be 
acquired, possessed, sold, traded, donated, transported, and disposed 
of by any person without a permit," while ensuring that this exception 
does not apply to wild mallard ducks, stating that "[n]othing in this 
section shall be construed to permit the taking of live mallard ducks 
or their eggs from the wild. "287 A similar provision concerns the taking 
of captive-reared waterfowl: "[a]ny person may, without a permit, law-
277 Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 1073 (quoting United States v. Manning, 787 
F.2d 431, 435 nA (8th Cir. 1986». 
278 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U .S.C. § 707 (a) (2000). 
279 [d. § 707(b). 
200 Seeid. § 711; 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.13-.14 (2003). 
281 16 U.S.C. § 711. 
282 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.13-.14. 
283 United States v. Conners, 606 F.2d 269, 270-73 (10th Cir. 1979); Koop v. United 
States, 296 F.2d 53, 53--61 (8th Cir. 1961). 
284 16 U.S.C. § 711. 
286 [d. 
286 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.13-.14. 
287 [d. § 21.13. 
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fully acquire [and kill] captive-reared and properly marked migratory 
waterfowl of all species other than mallard ducks, alive or dead, or 
their eggs, and possess and transport such birds or eggs. "288 Moreover, 
as already discussed, courts painstakingly distinguish between wild 
and captive-bred mallard ducks in deciding whether MBTA protection 
applies, consistently holding that while wild mallard ducks are within 
the MBTA's protection, captive-bred mallards are not.289 
F. &-Thinking the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
That the MBTA should be so modest, speaking on one level in 
the language of property rights, is not surprising: when protection of 
wildlife is expected to meet some public resistance, that protection 
needs to be phrased in terms that will soften that resistance. One 
strategy for minimizing this resistance is to assure the public that what 
is being protected all along is, in fact, human interests. Indeed, the 
legislative history of the MBTA suggests that what made the Act so 
palatable to Congress was the shared impression that it was all about 
protecting the food supply,290 and maintaining a steady supply of 
game animals for the upper classes.291 In this way, the purpose of the 
MBTA was not to recognize the intrinsic value of migratory birds, but 
to prevent the "annual food losses caused by insects [that] require 
protection of birds"292 and to "facilitate the incursion of the exclusive 
hunting clubs."293 
But modesty often means compromise, and that is true here. 
When protection stops short of offending human interests, it compro-
288 Id. § 21.l4. 
289 See discussion supra Part II.D. 
290 See United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 45 F. Supp.2d 1070, 1080 (D. Colo. 
1999). 
291 Id. at 1082. Representative Huddleston stated: 
assuming no kind of punishment is too severe for the boy who robs a bird's 
nest, I call attention to the fact that this bill [MBTAJ does not protect game 
birds. Instead of being called "a bill for the protection of game birds,· it 
ought to be named "a bill for the protection of game-bird hunters.· The real 
purpose of this bill, so far as it applies to game birds, is not to protect the 
birds, is not to give them life, but to fix it so that the ragged boys, the people 
far away in the country who have not bird dogs-to fix it so that the common 
people of the country can not get their fair share of the game and so that 
only those who are able to afford game preserves and fancy equipment for 
hunting and all the paraphernalia that goes with it ... can get the game. 
56 CONGo REc. 7364 (1918). 
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293 Id. at 7375. 
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mises its regulatory potency. IT protection must be phrased in terms of 
utility and human interests, it will never be designed to offend those 
interests, or to subordinate them to higher values which take as their 
starting point the interests of the wildlife protected. A different regula-
tory scheme focusing on the interests of wildlife would recognize that 
the intrinsic value of the animal itself must play more of a role in draft-
ing the language and articulating the purpose of the Act. At the very 
least, it must enter more robustly into the cost-benefit exercise that 
keeps human interests at the forefront in the regulatory design. Such a 
scheme would overcome the inclination to consider animals as mere 
property existent only to serve human benefit. It would recognize that 
the world does not exist only for humans; instead, it would acknowl-
edge that "[t]he living creation is biocentric. "294 
In this context, the fact that the MBTA distinguishes between 
captive-bred and wild migratory birds indicates that this self-
proclaimed champion of the nation's wildlife retains a decidedly an-
thropocentric worldview. The question now is whether making this 
concession to the priority of human utility is still necessary to wildlife 
regulation or whether it was merely a precondition of its origin, a 
comprise that sets the framework. IT animals are protected for their 
own sake, the MBTA need not distinguish captive-bred from wild mi-
gratory birds. If the answer to that question is that it remains necessary 
for contemporary attempts at regulation, then the MBTA's history 
must be rethought in terms of the precedent it left in thinking about 
wildlife protection. Without the realization that animals cannot be 
understood solely in terms of human property and utility, wildlife pro-
tection laws will be successful only to the extent that they protect hu-
mans. Surely such regulation does not deserve the moniker wildlife 
protection. In the words of Lisa Mighetto, "[u]ntil we abandon hu-
man-centered motives, animal protection will never be completely 
successful. "295 
CONCLUSION 
The thrust of this Note has been to identify those points where 
the protectionist scheme of the MBTA makes concessions, or at least 
where it seems to wane in its protection. The problem thus identified 
is that by its own terms, it contemplates itself as protecting humans 
and not the migratory birds. To set up a protectionist scheme with the 
294 LlBER"IY HYDE BAILEY, THE HOLY EARn! 20 (Charles Scribner's Sons 1915). 
295 MlGHETrO, supra note I, at 118. 
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migratory birds as the beneficiaries, we may have to fashion new, 
higher rights that belong to wildlife. That is, if we want wildlife pro-
tection without compromise, it must recognize values intrinsic to 
animals and not values that humans find it convenient to give them. 
This entails that such textual distinctions between the mallard duck 
bred on someone's pond and the mallard duck born on a wild pond 
would have no principled basis. 

